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Abstract Oil and gas as the non-renewable resources are
considered very valuable for the countries with petroleum
economics. These resources are not only diffused equally
around the world, but also they are common in some places
which their neighbors often come into conflicts. Conse-
quently, it is vital for those countries to manage their
resource utilization. Lately, game theory was applied in
conflict resolution of common resources, such as water,
which is a proof of its efficacy and capability. This paper
models the conflicts between Iran and its neighbors namely
Qatar and Iraq between their oil and gas common resources
using game theory approach. In other words, the future of
these countries will be introduced and analyzed by some
well-known 2 9 2 games to achieve a better perspective of
their conflicts. Because of information inadequacy of the
players, in addition to Nash Stability, various solution
concepts are used based on the foresight, disimprovements,
and knowledge of preferences. The results of mathematical
models show how the countries could take a reasonable
strategy to exploit their common resources.
Keywords Conflict resolution  Non-cooperative game
theory  Oil and gas common resources  Stability
definitions
Introduction
The subject of common resources including oil and gas has
become a crucial issue for countries such as Iran, which
their economy depends greatly on revenues produced by oil
and gas (Ilias 2008). The conflicts over common resources,
faced by these countries, derive from not only the matters
of benefits and costs, but also the social and political
aspects of managing the resources.
Game theory can simply identify and explicate the
behaviors of the parties involved in a conflict, without
requiring a large number of data in hand. In fact, it is
showed that the solutions provided by game theory are
closer to practice in comparison with other common
methods, due to better reflection of how involved parties
behave in reality (Madani 2010). In the literature, game
theory has applied to study the issues of common oil and
gas resources with various purposes, including modeling,
management and resolution.
Importing and exporting oil and gas have been modeled
by game theory in the literature. For instance, the oil
importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations
(OPEC) are modeled as a two-person non-zero-sum game
by Shenoy (1980a). Moreover, Shenoy (1980a) presents the
non-cooperative and cooperative strategies to obtain the
Nash and the von Neumann–Morgenstern negotiation
solutions. Later, a three-person game is remodeled as
cooperative concepts such as the Core, the Shapley value,
the bargaining set and the Nucleolus which its players were
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led by Iran and Saudi Arabia (Shenoy 1980b). Similar to
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) and Friedman and
Savage (1948), Reynolds (1999) described an alternative
theory for OPEC behavior based on risk aversion utilizing
a two-piece von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. In
addition, Massol and Tchung-Ming (2010) examined the
development of cooperative policy between countries
exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and members of
the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) to obtain
Shapley Value and Nucleolus-inspired equilibria.
Moreover, the cooperative and non-cooperative strate-
gies for the transit gas are studied by Schirillo (2006) and
Zweifel et al. (2009). Grais and Zheng (1996) considered
gas transit game as a three-player conflict including sup-
pliers, transistors and importers under non-cooperative
Stackelberg game. In 2003, the shippers’ interaction on a
gas transportation system was modeled as a two-stage
game to obtain the Nash equilibria by Pagliero (2003).
Later, two-stage games were also presented in pricing and
the common property problems by DalleMule (2008) and
Heintzelman et al. (2009).
Exploitation and production of the resources are studied
as other important subjects in the oil and gas area. The
resource extraction with m hyperbolic players is modeled
under a dynamic game by Nowak (2006). He assumed the
Cobb–Douglas production by constructing a Markov sub-
game perfect equilibrium and analyzing the equilibrium
path. Exploitation of common resources with social welfare
function is the other discussing topic by consisting of
games with finitely many players and a continuum of
players by Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel (2008). Furthermore,
the interaction between the oil consumers and the suppliers
about the production strategy is discussed as a signaling
game by Lin-lin and Zhong-ying (2008). They obtained the
separating, pooling and hybrid equilibria in their model.
Yang (2008) simulates strategic interactions between
OPEC’s decisions and ANWR (Alaskan Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge) exploration as a dynamic game. Boyce
and Vojtassak (2008) developed the theory of ‘oil’igopoly
exploration of resource based on predicting over-explore
and Nash equilibrium level of exploration. Later Kra-
sovskii et al. (2009) suggested a game-dynamic model of
the operation of several interacting gas pipeline projects by
modeling the current quantities of gas supply as approxi-
mations to Nash equilibrium points in the instantaneous
‘‘gas supply games’’. The study resulted in finding
numerically Nash equilibrium commercialization policies
for the entire group of the pipelines and using the model to
analyze Caspian gas market. Castillo and Dorao (2013)
introduced a decision-making framework based on game
theory that simultaneously solves a multi-objective and
multi-level decision making problem for the conceptual
design and project evaluation in the oil and gas industry.
Game theory is also used in saving energy subject. For
example, Magirou (1984) analyzed the process of national
decision making about energy saving and fuel switching
programs under non-cooperative policy as a non-zero-sum
game. Afterward, strategic petroleum reserves were pre-
sented as a Markov game and a stochastic dynamic game to
build up and draw down the policies by Fan and Zhang
(2010) and Murphy and Oliveira (2010). Moreover, Aplak
and Sogut (2013) evaluated a hybrid methodology con-
sisting of fuzzy and game theoretic approaches for energy
management decision making process. In this model, the
players were defined as Industry and environment, and
using MCDM methods their strategies were analyzed. The
obtained hybrid method could be used in complex struc-
tures like sectors from production to consumption, and also
energy intensive sectors.
Although oil and gas resources are studied from several
perspectives in the literature, managing such vital resources
not only requires a proper recognition of plans and objec-
tives, but also necessitates the cognizance of limitations and
conditions. For instance, Iran has a large number of joint
fields on borders with Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
United Arab Emirates and Oman (Esrafili and Kiani 2011).
The number of joint oil and gas fields in Iran is estimated
near 28, including 18 oil fields, 4 gas fields and 6 oil and gas
fields, which make Iran one of the few countries in the world
who has this grand number of hydrocarbour resources (Mehr
News 2011). But unfortunately, common field developments
by Iran have been delayed due to various technical prob-
lems, contractual issues and recently politics (Johnson and
Bruno 2012). While in the meantime, all the involved
countries are outrunning Iran by rapidly developing and
exploiting the fields without considering the irreversible
repercussions. In fact the statistics provided by Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries bulletin (OPEC) on
2010–2011 (OPEC 2010–2011) show that the proportion of
oil exportations to whole exportations for Iran, Qatar and
Iraq is 85.4, 40.6, 98.2 %, respectively. Therefore, it is
concluded that in spite of the great dependence of Iran’s
economy on oil exportation, Iran has not been able to profit
from its numerous resources as well as other competing
countries such as Qatar and Iraq.
Notwithstanding the research in theoretical aspects in
common resource conflict (Gibbons 1992; Ostrom et al.
1994), the solution concepts are not yet well applied into
real common resources confliction. Therefore, in this
paper, it is attempted to illustrate the worthwhile utility of
game theory in managing of Iran’s common resource
conflict. In other words, by presenting some famous games
of oil and gas resources between Iran and its surrounding
countries which share common resources, they would be
able to make better decisions and, therefore, manage their
resources more accurately.
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In the next section, a brief explanation of game theory
and wide range of solution concepts are presented. In
‘‘Iran’s oil and gas common resource management as non-
cooperative games’’ Iran’s oil and gas conflicts with
aforementioned countries are presented using well-known
2 9 2 games. Then, in ‘‘Advisable policies for each player
in introduced games’’, most advisable policies for each
player in separate games are offered to manage optimally
their incomes and resources. Finally, conclusion and some
suggestions for future works are presented.
Game theory
Game theory is a branch of mathematics, operations
research and economics applied to study decision makers’
behavior in conflict resolution. A conflict may arise when
two or more agents with different objectives share the same
system or resources (Krippendorff 1986). These agents
may be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of
these (Turocy and Von Stengel 2001). A game is described
as the interactions between players whose decisions affect
the payoffs of others (Bahrini 2011). Game theory is
defined by three specifications: the number of players, their
strategies and their payoffs (Shor 2005a). Based on the
payoffs of players, games are divided into two major cat-
egories, zero-sum games and non-zero-sum game. In zero-
sum games, whatever one player gains, the other player
loses vice versa of non-zero-sum games. Non-zero-sum
games better represent real-life situations that have more
complications in the decision making process (Schneider
2001), and sometimes more potential for cooperation.
Often, players will notice that their interests might at least
sometimes be best served by not cooperating, or in other
words swerving from the system’s optimal solutions
(Madani and Hipel 2011). In game theory, each player
chooses a policy that optimizes his own objective. There-
fore, this method is believed to be able to simulate the
conflicts more realistically. Because in practice, the prin-
cipal concern of players is to maximize their own benefits
by making a decision which might not be beneficial to the
whole system. These self-optimizing attitudes might pro-
vide non-cooperative behaviors from players, even when
cooperative behavior is the best solution for all, and that is
where game theory can be more powerful than other
methods (Madani 2010).
Besides, the lack of availability of specific data which
sometimes are inevitable does not bound game theoretical
analyses. Through such analyses, not only the important
aspects of the decision problem can be identified but also
the participants can learn much through the approach and
the point of view of game theory. Moreover, game theory
provides us with the ability to analyze different situations
from various aspects. It can contribute to achieve pros-
perity in international and political affairs, business, peace
and war (Bahrini 2011).
To analyze the games, there are major characteristics for
solution concepts, including foresight, willingness to dis-
improve and knowledge of preferences (Madani et al.
2011). The most commonly used solution concept in game
theory is the well-known Nash stability (Madani and Hipel
2011). However, considering people’s complicated atti-
tudes, a solution concept like Nash might not be able to
reflect the decisions of people with all kinds of character-
istics (Bahrini 2011). Therefore, application of various
solution concepts while analyzing a game might better
reflect the game’s outcomes (Madani and Hipel 2007). The
games are analyzed using several stability definitions
including the Nash stability (R), General meta-rationality
(GMR), Symmetric meta-rationality (SMR), Sequential
stability (SEQ), Limited-move stability (Lh), and Non-
myopic stability (NM) which the main characteristics are
briefly shown in Table 1 (for more details, see Madani and
Hipel (2011)). In addition, some of the basic characteristics
of a game such as dominant strategy, strictly dominant
strategy, and Pareto optimal outcomes are investigated.




Characteristics Sub-characteristics Stability definitions
Nash GMR SMR SEQ Lh NM
Foresight Low (1 move) 4
Medium (2 moves) 4 4
Medium (3 moves) 4
Variable (h moves) 4
Unlimited 4
Disimprovements Never 4 4
By opponent 4 4
Strategic 4 4
Knowledge of preferences Own 4 4 4
All 4 4 4
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Iran’s oil and gas common resource management
as non-cooperative games
Because of many reasons such as the non-renewable
structure of oil and gas resources, prediction of scientists
about lack of resources in the near future, etc., oil and gas
conflicts occurring in the real world are often complicated;
therefore, it is indispensable to describe these complex
models with less-complicated game theory models. How-
ever, using such simple models can lead to increased
understanding of the real-world conflict in terms of its
fundamental structure and strategic potentialities (Madani
and Hipel 2011). In the following subsections, some
famous 2 9 2 games are introduced, formulated, and
solved. Additionally, the probable outcome of the conflicts
is analyzed using a wide range of solution concepts and the
results are discussed.
Iran–Qatar conflict over South Pars and North
Dome common oil field (Prisoner’s Dilemma game)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is one of the most famous
strategic games in game theory. Its name comes from a
story involving suspects in a crime. Its importance is due to
various situations in which the parties have incentives
similar to those faced by the suspects in prisoner’s
dilemma. In other words, different real-world conflicts of
economic, social and even political aspects can appropri-
ately be modeled by PD (Bahrini 2011). The conflict
between Iran and Qatar over South Pars oil field at the
present time (January, 2015) which is shown in Fig. 1
could be an example of coordination oil resource games.
This field covers an area of 9700 square kilometers of
which less than 40 % is in Iranian territorial waters (South
Pars) and the rest is in Qatari territorial waters (North Field
or North Dome) (Chabrelie 2006). Qatar has started
extraction of natural gas from the North Dome since 1991.
With more than a decade of deferment, Iran started
extraction in 2002. But unlike Qatar, Iran has not made
much remarkable progress (IRAEE 2008).
As for the South Pars oil field, the situation is even more
critical (Mehr News 2011). A few years ago (2009), Iran
claimed that South Pars oil field is not a common field
(Fars News Agency 2009) and, therefore, some deal it is
not their first priority to develop it (BEDigest 2011; Mehr
News 2011). At the present time (January, 2015), due to
lack of international investment, contractual issues (John-
son and Bruno 2012) and also by not being provided with
the adequate financial resources, Iran has the most retar-
dation in the development of South Pars’ common layers.
On the other hand, Qatar has been able to make use of this
field, and is extracting oil with the average of 700 thousand
barrels per day (Tala News 2013). It is predicted that by
completion of some of the development stages in the
upcoming year, the extraction of this country from the oil
layers of South Pars would reach up to 1 million barrels per
day. At the same time, the share of Iran from this common
oil field compared to Qatar is insignificant (Mehr News
2011).
During this period, the structure could be similar to a
Prisoner’s Dilemma. At first, countries might assume that
the more they extract, the more they can gain; however,
without having a long-term vision players may face various
complications in future. If both countries extract at high
extraction rates (HER), not only the oil levels would drop,
but also the extracting costs would increase. In addition, it
Fig. 1 Geographical location of
Iran–Qatar conflict over South
Pars and North Dome common
oil (EP-2010)
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would reduce profit and ultimately lead into economic
infeasibility of extraction (EBI 2003a). It is worth
remembering that oil and gas exploration, extraction and
production may leave negative impacts on ecosystems and
biodiversity (EBI 2003b). But if both countries extract at a
low extraction rate (LER), the oil level will not decrease
and countries can enjoy long-term profits. In other words,
cooperative extraction increases profits for both countries.
Qatar has achieved the best outcome which is getting a
‘‘free ride’’. In this case, the extraction costs are low
compared to the state where both countries extract non-
cooperatively and the crop sale revenues are high in
comparison with states where Qatar decides to cooperate.
Alternatively, high extraction costs and low crop revenues
lead to the lowest payoffs, if Qatar selects a cooperative
policy while Iran does not wish to cooperate. Figure 2
represents the conflict in a normal form with cardinal
payoffs. In this figure, the two rows and the two columns
correspond to the two possible actions of Iran and Qatar,
respectively. The numbers in each cell are the players’
payoffs to the action profile to which the cell corresponds,
with Iran’s payoff listed first. A greater payoff indicates a
higher utility for a player. It should be noted that the
ordinal payoff in Fig. 2 is obtained based on the parametric
form of model in the appendix (A). The outcomes of the
game, considering different solution concepts, are shown in
Table 2.
In this game, cooperative extraction (LER, LER) would
provide both countries with more benefits which are
socially efficient and Pareto optimal. States (LER, HER)
and (HER, LER) in which Qatar and Iran are giving a free
ride, respectively, are the worst outcome for each country.
However, the cooperative resolution is Pareto optimal,
which means that extraction by at least one player is the
Pareto optimal solution. It is worth mentioning that a low
extraction rate would keep the system survival. In addition,
HER is a strictly dominant strategy for each player and
(HER, HER) is a Pareto inferior outcome, a strictly dom-
inant strategy equilibrium and the only Nash equilibrium of
the game. The results show that according to all considered
stability definitions, (HER, HER) is stable for the two
players and is considered as an equilibrium for all the
solution methods, although this state is not quite appro-
priate considering the payoffs of each party. (HER, LER)
and (LER, HER) are stable under all the stability defini-
tions only for one of the players (the one who is getting a
free ride) and are never considered as equilibria. State
(LER, LER) is Pareto optimal which is stable under all
stability definitions except Nash. Therefore, only a short-
sighted player would not recognize this stable state and any
player who can see at least two moves (including the
adversary’s) is capable of such distinction. The states
which are stable under more stability definitions have more
chance in practical conflict resolution (Madani and Hipel
2011). Thus, (LER, LER) and (HER, HER) are the prob-
able outcomes of such games.
In real conflicts, players often have wider foresight than
what Nash stability predicts (Bahrini 2011). Consequently,
state (LER, LER) provides the players with higher payoffs
comparing to (HER, HER); thus, (LER, LER) is most
likely to be the final outcome. State (LER, HER) is the
status quo of the conflict in which Iran and Qatar are
exploiting the oil field with a low and high extraction rate,
respectively. Although the structure of the presented game
is similar to PD, in this game the players are able to change
their strategies repeatedly, unlike PD which is a one-move
game (Madani and Hipel 2011). In the status quo, Qatar is




LER 2, 2 0, 3 
HER 3, 0 1, 1 
Fig. 2 Iran–Qatar conflict over South Pars and North Dome common
oil field (PD game)
Table 2 The results of stability
analysis for the Iran–Qatar
conflict
Stability definition (LER, LER) (LER, HER) (HER, LER) (HER, HER)
Stable for
Iran Qatar Iran Qatar Iran Qatar Iran Qatar
Nash (R) 4 4 4 4
GMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SEQ 4 4 4 4 4 4
L2 4 4 4 4 4 4
L3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Non-Myopic (L4) 4 4 4 4 4 4
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This state would remain the best possible outcome for
Qatar enjoying the benefits unless Iran implements a
credible action to achieve a high rate extraction. Needless
to mention that based on various solution concepts, (HER,
LER) and (LER, HER) are not considered stable. As a
result, the current state will not also be stable. On the other
hand, Iran is making the least profit from the common oil
resources in the current situation. Iran is better off con-
sidering the loss of benefits, therefore, change its policy
and move from LER to HER. If Iran assigns more financial
resources to exploitation and extraction, the game would be
led towards (HER, HER). In that case, if countries are non-
myopic and aware of the payoffs, they would try to reach
the state (LER, LER) to maximize their long-term benefits.
To reach this state, both countries are required to shift from
HER to LER simultaneously or else they would both end
up in worse situations.
Iran–Iraq conflict over well number four of Fakka
field (Chicken game)
Game of Chicken is a game in which two drivers driving
towards each other at high speeds. Each player can either
swerve (S) or drive straight (DS). The first one to swerve
would be called the ‘‘chicken’’ for not having the courage
to drive straight ahead and the other would be a proud
winner. If none of them swerves, they would both suffer
injuries or even die due to a fatal accident. It is supposed
that when both drivers ‘‘chicken out’’, they drive in an
opposite direction not leading to an accident (Madani and
Hipel 2011). An example of an anti-coordination game
could be the Iran–Iraq conflict on the well Number Four of
the Fakka field (Fig. 3).
In 2009, border controversies were incited as Iraq started
to sell development rights to fields like Fakka which are
close to Iran’s frontier (The New York Times 2009). After
mentioned controversies, in December of 2009, Iraq
announced that about ten Iranian soldiers have crossed the
border, occupied well Number Four in Maysan Province in
southeastern Iraq and flagged it (BBC News 2009). Iraq
considered this act as an invasion and demanded immediate
evacuation of the field. Iraq claimed to have dug oil wells
on the Fakka field before the Iran–Iraq war, but Iran stated
that the area near well Number Four occupied by its sol-
diers was a part of its own territory (Reuters 2009; The
New York Times 2009). The Iraqi government declared
that they were hoping to solve this problem diplomatically
(Asr Iran 2009). Later that day, the Iranian troops with-
drew. This withdrawal was followed by the entrance of
Iraqi technicians to the well Number Four zone and initi-
ation of the preliminaries of exploitation (RFI 2009).
Although Iraq had said that they were not planning a
military reaction, it is possible that if Iran had not left the
territory, or in other words ‘‘chickened out’’, it would have
been considered as an option, especially with having in
mind the history of Iran and Iraq including the border
disputes between the two countries which set off the
1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war. As mentioned before, the
structure of this conflict could be similar to a chicken
game. Based on Fig. 4, each country can either Dare (D) or
Chicken out (C). It should be noted that the ordinal payoff
in Fig. 4 is obtained based on the parametric form of model
in the appendix (B).
If both players select (C, C), they would leave the well
unexploited and might reach a cooperative solution during
further negotiations. By choosing (C, D) or (D, C), one of
the countries would dare to exploit and benefit from the
well, while the other would leave the area empty handed.
However, if none of the countries chicken out and both
decide to stick with the challenge, then it is possible that
the rage heats up and leads to a catastrophic outcome,
similar to the war of 1980s. State (D, D) produces the
Fig. 3 The location of Fakka oil field on borders of Iran and Iraq
(The New York Times 2009)
 Iraq  
C D 
Iran 
C 3, 3 2, 4 
D 4, 2 1, 1 
Fig. 4 Iran–Iraq conflict over well number four of Fakka field
(Chicken game)
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lowest payoff for both countries and, therefore, they would
rather not choose this strategy considering its high political,
financial and mortal casualties.
The results in Table 3 show that state (C, C) is chosen
by a player who considers possible disimprovements by the
opponent player and possesses at least a two-level foresight
(GMR) or a risk accepting player who allows strategic
disimprovements and has at least a three-level foresight
(SMR, L3 and L4). A state in which one country dares and
the other chickens out is considered stable based on all the
applied solution concepts, even by a shortsighted player not
aware of the opponent’s preferences. For this game, due to
its anti-coordination structure, at least one of the parties
will chicken out. All the above states are Pareto optimal
except state (D, D) which is never selected by players.
However, there is no dominant or even strictly dominant
strategy in the aforementioned chicken game.
If countries resemble in behaviors, meaning they both
have a high risk tolerance and take disimprovements into
account, therefore, they both decide to chicken out [state
(C, C)] and postpone their compromises for further bar-
gains, which is likely to be an outcome of the game.
Having the characteristics defined by Nash, players often
disregard the possibility of cooperation. In that case, one
player will definitely get a free ride. But such a stable state
is not regarded as equilibrium for a risk accepting player
who considers strategic disimprovements. Moreover,
countries are not motivated to select (D, D) as a possible
outcome, bearing in mind the disastrous results of the
probable dispute.
As it was mentioned before, in this conflict Iran decided
to give a free ride. In reality, parties may be involved in
various conflicts simultaneously. Giving a free ride may
not always mean giving up on benefits. Sometimes, coun-
tries prefer to overlook a privilege, intending to attain a
more crucial concession such as national security, envi-
ronmental protection, etc.
Iran–Iraq conflict over common oil and gas
resources (Stag-Hunt game)
Stag-Hunt (also known as the Trust Dilemma) is a game in
which two hunters go out on a hunt. Each player has two
options. He can choose to hunt a stag or a hare. Each hunter
can hunt a hare by himself, but if hunting a stag is desired,
the cooperation of his partner is demanded. Hunting a hare
may be tempting, knowing that it is easier to catch. On the
other side, hunting a stag which is quite large and, there-
fore, challenging requires mutual cooperation (Shor
2005b).
An oil and gas resource example with a stag-hunt
structure is shown in Fig. 5. It is worth mentioning that,
LER and MER stand for low extraction rate and maximum
extraction rate, respectively. It should be considered that
the ordinal payoff in Fig. 5 is obtained based on the
parametric form of model in the appendix (C).
This game is the predicted situation between Iran and
Iraq considering their oil and gas common fields. So far,
around twenty oil and gas fields have been identified on the
borders of Iran and Iraq and most of them are said to be
common fields between the two countries (Mehr News
2010). It is estimated that twelve out of these joint fields
are common oil fields, from which Iraq’s extraction rate is
said to be 295 thousand barrels per day. That is more than
twice Iran’s extraction rate (130 thousand barrels per day)
(Mehr News 2011).
Table 3 The results of stability
analysis for the Iran–Iraq
conflict (chicken game)
Stability definition (C, C) (C, D) (D, C) (D, D)
Stable for
Iran Iraq Iran Iraq Iran Iraq Iran Iraq
Nash (R) 4 4 4 4
GMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SEQ 4 4 4 4
L2 4 4
L3 4 4 4 4
Non-Myopic (L4) 4 4 4 4
 Iraq 
 LER MER 
Iran 
LER 3, 3 0, 2 
MER 2, 0 1, 1 
Fig. 5 Iran–Iraq conflict over common oil and gas resources (Stag-
Hunt game)
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After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the newly formed
Iraqi government decided to augment its oil production by
awarding considerable contracts to the major oil companies
of the world (CNN 2011). That was when the Iranian
officials were warned about the possibility of the migration
of Iranian oil from the joint oil fields to Iraq.
One of the few solutions suggested to Iran to prevent this
wasteful migration was for both countries to start operating
the joint oil fields simultaneously (Mehr News 2010). But
even this solution will probably not be able to resolve the
issue completely. If there are several operators for a joint oil
field, each would try to reach the highest production rate of oil
in the shortest time possible. Under such circumstances, since
the main focus is on maximizing production, the maintenance
of the oil field and production optimization would at least be
partly disregarded. Such a policy would damage the entire
field to the point where the interests of all the parties are
harmed (Mehr News 2010). In January 2011, the two coun-
tries announced that in order to increase their crude output,
they have reached an agreement to develop joint oil fields on
border areas (Press TV News 2012b). If they both exploit the
fields with an equal and reasonable extraction rate which is
less than the maximum rate possible, the conditions of the
fields are monitored more accurately; thus, the long-term
benefits of proper maintenance of the fields exceed the rev-
enue losses from extracting less than maximum.
However, if only one country exploits the fields trying to
maximize its production, the fields may not be damaged
entirely, but their long-term benefits would be minimal, and the
other country’s payoff would decrease because of the revenue
losses from a lower extraction rate. This is similar to the current
conditions (January, 2015) of Iran and Iraq, in which Iraq is the
one country who is exploiting the fields intending to maximize
its production. If countries intend to profit from the long-term
benefits of the resource, they are obliged to exploit the fields
with an appropriate low extraction rate (LER) which leads to
the outcome (LER, LER). Game theory presents this suitable
outcome as equilibrium of the game according to all the
applied solution concepts (see Table 4).
Choosing the cooperative policy LER is similar to
hunting a stag which is more difficult to hunt requiring the
other player’s cooperation, but in fact leads to more
benefits.
Moreover, results show that though the Pareto optimal
resolution (LER, LER) is considered as an equilibrium, if
players are shortsighted and not equipped with the ability
to risk, they might both choose to exploit the fields with the
maximum extraction rate (MER), introducing state (MER,
MER) which is another equilibrium for the game. Such
outcome has the potential to endanger the non-renewable
resource to the point of its complete deterioration. In this
game, similar to PD game, the cooperative resolution is
Pareto optimal. Moreover, like the chicken game, there are
neither dominant nor strictly dominant strategies for this
conflict. However, since players cooperate during the stag-
hunt game, state (LER, LER) is considered Pareto optimal.
Only based on GMR and SMR solution concepts, states
(LER, MER) and (LER, HER) in which one country
chooses not to cooperate are considered stable for the
country who is profiting more. Therefore, these states are
not considered as equilibria and predictable outcomes of
the game. Based on the previous explanations, the state in
which Iran and Iraq are extracting with a low and maxi-
mum extraction rate, respectively, is not stable. Therefore,
the status quo of the game (LER, MER) would not a
probable outcome. The best solution for Iran which is also
the best outcome of the game is to convince Iraq to
decrease its extraction and shift from MER to LER. But
Iraq might not agree to cooperate with Iran due to its other
national or international concerns. In that case, increasing
the extraction rate and shifting from LER to MER would
provide Iran with more benefits. It is worth mentioning that
strategies selected by players in a stag-hunt game are
deeply affected by mutual trust which can be attained in
repeated games. Players will definitely choose the coop-
erative policy by knowing that the other player is trust-
worthy or by receiving cooperative signals. Some basic
characteristics of the presented games in ‘‘Iran’s oil and gas
Table 4 The results of stability
analysis for the Iran–Iraq
conflict (Stag-Hunt game)
Stability definition (LER, LER) (LER, MER) (MER, LER) (MER, MER)
Stable for
Iran Iraq Iran Iraq Iran Iraq Iran Iraq
Nash (R) 4 4 4 4
GMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SMR 4 4 4 4 4 4
SEQ 4 4 4 4
L2 4 4
L3 4 4
Non-Myopic (L4) 4 4
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common resource management as non-cooperative games’’
are summarized in Table 5.
Advisable policies for each player in introduced
games
There are several advices for the players in aforementioned
games that will be explained in this section separately.
Iran–Qatar conflict over South Pars and North
Dome common oil field
Iran: changing its strategy from LER to HER
Based on this assumption, which is (HER, HER), Iran
should negotiate and attempt to set up an agreement with
Qatar to decline the extraction rate simultaneously.
Qatar: continuing exploitation with a maximum extraction
rate.
This condition is ideal for Qatar as long as Iran extracts
with a low rate. Forasmuch as the current situation is not
stable, it is appropriate for Qatar to change its policy to
LER when Iran moves from LER to MER.
According to unexpected incomes from extraction the
resources, it is worth mentioning that Qatar must not
change its policy as soon as Iran change its extraction rate
from low to maximum.
Iran–Iraq conflict over well number four of Fakka
field
Iran: intending to manage a more fundamental concession
such as national security, environmental protection, etc
Since Iran gives a free ride to Iraq and chickened out in this
conflict, as it mentioned before, giving a free ride may not
always means giving up on benefits. It might be vital for
Iran to overcome the abovementioned priorities instead of
involving in conflicts with Iraq. This action might justify
leaving some of oil fields unexploited. Bearing in mind that
if Iran try to change its policy to Dare (D), its payoff
decreases from 2 to 1. Iran might be able to convince Iraq
to chicken out and in this condition Iran can exploit the
fields in a more suitable situation.
Iraq: joying of long-term benefits from exploitation
of Fakka field without any disruption by Iran
In addition to joying long-time benefits, it is necessary for
Iraq to stabilize the current situation.
Iran–Iraq conflict over common oil and gas
resources
Iran: increasing extraction rate to maximum
Since the status quo of the game is low extraction rate by
Iran and maximum extraction rate for Iraq, by ignoring
the potential endangerment of the resources, Iran should
increase its extraction rate to maximum. Based on this
assumption, which is (MER, MER), the payoffs of the
players will be very low. After that change, it is best for
Iran to negotiate and try to set up an agreement with Iraq
to turn down the extraction rate together. In this afore-
mentioned state, both countries can achieve the highest
payoff and can profit from the long-term benefits of the
resources. It is worth remembering that the current situ-
ation is not stable and it is not a predictable outcome of
this conflict.
Iraq: altering strategy from MER to LER
Because the payoff of Iraq will progress and this country
can enjoy from the long-term benefits. Moreover, the state
in which Iraq decide to extract at a low rate is a Pareto
optimal and moving to this state can improve political and
also economic relationships between Iran and Iraq. How-
ever, Iraq should consider that the current situation (LER,
MER) will not remain stable.








Dominant strategy HER – –
Strictly dominant strategy HER – –
Strictly dominant strategy equilibrium (HER, HER) – –
Pareto optimal outcome (LER, HER), (HER, LER), (LER, LER) (C, C), (C, D), (D, C) (LER, LER)
Classification Coordination game Anti-coordination game Coordination game
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Taking everything into consideration, unfortunately, the
outcomes show that despite the measures taken by other
countries, Iran has not been able to make effectual and
winning decisions. In this case, Iran would be better off
representing a more accurate image to the international
community by developing and improving terms with
countries in the region, therefore, obviating the problems of
oil and gas field development such as sanctions and prof-
iting from the benefits of these resources equally as the
adversaries.
Conclusion
Managing use of non-renewable resources such as oil and
gas is very important for the countries that their economics
depends on petroleum. Particularly, it would be crucial
when the resources are common with their neighbors. It is
worth mentioning that developing a model with the ability
to simulate the real-world conflicts in detail is almost
impossible. To achieve a better perception of real-world
conflicts, modeling the games and analyzing them can
provide new insights.
In this paper, Iran’s conflict with Qatar and Iraq which
share oil and gas common resources is modeled based on
game theory approach. Developed models are analyzed and
performed by considering different solution concepts that
led to a more comprehensive perspective of Iran’s conflicts.
The results can be applied as useful means for oil and gas
common resources’ management and conflict resolution.
Thus, based on recommendation to the players, the coun-
tries could select a reasonable policy to exploit their
common resources.
There is much scope in extending the present study. For
example, the existence of signals in the models can be
considered in the presented conflicts. Furthermore, in the
real-world problems, there are more players and also there
exist more options in the game. Considering these kinds of
limitations can present the predictions more realistic.
Additionally, the interconnection of Iran and Iraq games
can be taken into account for further researches.
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Appendix
Regarding chosen strategy of the players, Cournot model
and market elasticity, the parametric form of each model is
as follows:
(A) Prisoner’s dilemma parametric form:






¼ PðLER;HERÞ \PðLER; LERÞ
3Þ
PðLER;HERÞ  Cð ÞQðHERÞ[ PðLER; LERÞð
CÞQðLERÞ[ PðHER;HERÞ  Cð ÞQðHERÞ[






where P is the Price, K is the Market elasticity, QIran
is the Iran’s oil extraction, and QQatar is the Qatar’s
oil extraction, P(i, j). The price when the first and the
second players choose i and j, respectively
(i = LER, MER; j = LER, MER). C = Set up cost.
(B) Chicken game parametric form:






3Þ PðC;DÞ  Cð ÞQðDÞ[ PðC;CÞ  Cð ÞQðCÞ
[ PðC;DÞ  Cð ÞQðCÞ[ PðD;DÞ  Cð ÞQðDÞ
where P is the Price, K is the Market elasticity, QIran
is the Iran’s exploitation, and QIraq is the Iraq’s
exploitation, P(i, j) = The price when the first and
the second players choose i and j, respectively
(i = C, D; j = C, D). C = Set up cost.
(C) Stag-Hunt game parametric form


































P(HER, HER) C Q(HER)
⎞⎛ −
⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ − ⎠⎝
Fig. 6 Parametric form of Iran–Qatar conflict over South Pars and
North Dome common oil field (PD game)
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where P is the Price, K is the Market elasticity, QIran
is the Iran’s oil and gas extraction, and QIraq is the
Iraq’s oil and gas extraction, P(i, j) = The price
when the first and the second players choose i and j,
respectively (i = LER, MER; j = LER, MER).
C = Set up cost (Figs. 6, 7, 8).
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